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Recent advances in technology have sharpened
our sense of the value that knowledge takes on in
commerce and also in national defense. We have
long been familiar with the importance of knowledge
as a commodity in the market place. A prime
example is the formula for Coca Cola, one of the
oldest trade secrets. We are also acquainted with the
value of certain technical information for national
security. The knowledge necessary for the produc-
tion of nuclear weaponry is a prime example in this
domain.
In the spheres of commerce and national defense,
the very usefulness of the information is the reason
for restricting its dissemination. If the Coca Cola
formula were in the public domain and other firms
could make the drink, its profitability to the Coca
Cola company, or its parent company, would pre-
sumably be significantly reduced. Similarly, the
advantage of devising a coating enabling planes to
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elude radar would be expected to diminish if the rele-
vant technical knowledge were disclosed to U.S.
citizens. It could not then be kept secret from the
enemy.
One indication of the value of information is that
those who own information through patent, copy-
right, or trade secrecy are often concerned with what
they call "piracy" or information theft -- that is,
unauthorized access. Indeed, most of us have
probably done something considered piracy by
owners of what is called intellectual property --
making a cassette tape of a friend's record or
copying computer programs. Those who control
information related to national defense are prone to
parallel concerns about unauthorized access.
At the same time we have other values which
collide with commercial or national security stakes in
restricting information. We want to see the store of
general knowledge increased and widely available
because we think that is good for society, for our
economic flourishing, and for the lives and careers
of individual people. So policy decisions about what
information should be in the public domain and what
information may be privately held by commercial
fIrms have wider signifIcance.
Restrictions on information for national security
reasons run up against our commitment to democratic
processes. If citizens are to engage in self-govern-
ment, make sound policy choices, and hold govern-
ment officials accountable, they need information.
Free expression and a flow of information is essen-
tial to produce people with habits of making deci-
sions on relevant grounds about things that matter.
Again, policy decisions about where to draw the line
between information that can be restricted by govern-
ment and information that should be in the public
domain have broad resonance.
Both commercial and national security control
make a difference to universities. They affect the
extent of knowledge available in universities and they
affect the atmosphere in the universities. In the view
of many, universities should be the most open and
democratic institutions in our society. If the univer-
sity is enmeshed with commercial proprietary infor-
mation or information restricted for national security
reasons, the atmosphere will presumably reflect this
restrictiveness.
Secrecy and control of information can arouse
passionate emotion wherever they come into play --
in families, on the playground, in the workplace, in
schools, in science, and in government. In fact,
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the psychology surrounding secrecy could be inves-
tigated as a separate and interesting topic in itself.
McGeorge Bundy, an author who has held high
positions in American universities and in U.S.
Government over the last 45 years, observed in his
account of the making and dropping of the atomic
bomb that tension over any secret is highest just
before it is revealed.1 I will not concentrate on the
psychology of secrecy. I want to focus instead on
the reasons for restricting the flow of information
and the impact of restrictions. I will look first at
information with commercial value and then at infor-
mation with national security value. I will try to
show that although some restriction in each sphere is
undeniably necessary, we tend to put too much faith
in the benefits of control. In so doing, we frustrate
achievement of the very ends we seek.
PRIV A1E CON1ROL
As a society, we depend upon innovation to
maintain our standard of living and to assure con-
tinuing economic prosperity. Information pertinent
to technological innovation is therefore especially
valuable. But protecting information is, in important
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ways, different from protecting tangible objects.
Someone who takes my car or my music repro-
duction system deprives me of their use and leaves
me obviously worse off. But suppose that I invent a
mechanism for my computer printer to load labels for
printing. The device does not jam and works swiftly
for any kind of label. If someone appropriates my
label loading innovation, I can still continue to use it
and get the benefit of it. In that respect I am not
worse off. You could say that it would be a benefit
to many others if my innovation were widely
disseminated. If I am granted exclusive, private
rights to my innovation, that is, monopoly control
requiring others to compensate me for using or re-
producing it, society loses a benefit, it seems. For
this reason, a system of private rights over informa-
tion has to be justified on grounds over and above
the practical necessity which justifies our laws gover-
ning tangible property.
When we talk about property rights to informa-
tion we are talking about intellectual property --
specifically patents, copyrights, and trade secrets.
These are the chief kinds of protection of interest
here. I won't take time to discuss these in detail. A
patent gives the holder rights over inventions (such
as a machine), processes (such as a way to synthe-
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size a chemical), and substances (such as a new
fonn of plastic). The patent holder has the right to
say who may use, produce, or sell his invention,
process, or substance. The protection is granted
only over material objects based on the inventor's
design or on material implementations of the process,
never on the idea that lies behind the material reali-
zation. So, for example, you could discuss the idea
of my label loading process without infringing the
patent I might have obtained.
Copyrights protect ways of expressing ideas.
The copyright holder, say the author (or more likely,
the publisher) of a short story, has the right to de-
tennine who may copy the words. Trade secrecy
covers the same subject matters as both patents and
copyrights and, in addition, confidential business
information, such as sales, marketing, pricing,
and advertising data, lists of customers and sup-
pliers, and even plant layout. Trade secrets are
defmed by the effort the owner takes to keep an item
secret. An item is not secret if the owner discusses it
over lunch in a restaurant. Trade secrets are also
defined by the effort needed to discover the secret
independently. Something that any engineer could
easily work out cannot rank as a trade secret. Trade
secrecy only protects against improper acquisition by
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others. Bribing an employee, for example, is a
tactic that falls below the common standards of
commercial morality. Such acquisition may allow
the trade secret holder a legal remedy in court. Trade
secrecy thus establishes a form of legal ownership.
In the last decade, a climate has grown that is
very hospitable to extending intellectual property
protection. In that period changes in the law and
decisions by the U.S. Supreme Court have redrawn
some lines that separate private from public infor-
mation. Proprietary protection has been extended to
new subject matters such as micro-organisms and
computer software. Substances found in nature only
in dilute or non-pure form are now patentable in pure
form. Almost any kind of plant is now patentable,
as are some animals. Universities and university
researchers have been extended the right to hold
patents on innovations made in the course of research
funded by the federal government. Such rights pre-
viously were held by the federal government which
had a policy of open licensing. This last change in
the law has meant that universities have become
much more entangled with patents than in the past.
Why have policy makers thought that more ex-
tensive intellectual property protection would be a
good thing? To answer, it will help to look at the
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original justification for the V.S. intellectual property
system. We find the original rationale in the V.S.
Constitution which gives Congress the power to
grant inventors and authors exclusive rights over
their works. The Constitution says that Congress
has power to "promote the progress of science and
the useful arts." Implicit in this justification is the
general expectation that the grant to innovators of
exclusive control over their creations, under certain
conditions, will foster science and practical appli-
cation.
Notice that the Constitution does not recognize
natural or moral rights of authors or inventors to the
benefits of their creations. It does not say, for
example, that because someone has added her labor
to the stock of knowledge she is entitled to property
rights. Rather, it appeals to the good consequences
of granting such property rights by law. The idea is
that financial remuneration is needed to stimulate a
desirable level of innovation. When you invest effort
and resources, for example, in devising a new form
of plastic, you would be at a disadvantage without
property rights in this innovation. Others could copy
it and offer it to the public at reduced costs because
they have not made the same investment. You as an
innovator would fail to recoup the costs of inno-
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vation and would have no incentive to continue
innovating. Ultimately, society would be seriously
damaged by the lack of innovation. Variations on
this rationale and other distinct rationales have been
formulated, but for simplicity this one will suffice
since it remains dominant in many contexts.
This justification depends on assumptions about
how things will work out. These assumptions are
very difficult to test. Contemplating such rationales
for protection, we are led to ask, "What if we did
things differently?" Such questions are notoriously
hard to answer. It is especially difficult to test the
proposition that we would be better or worse off in
the amount and nature of technological innovation if
we abandoned or modified our intellectual property
system. The special difficulty arises because parties
with inside knowledge of how intellectual property
protection actually works out are loathe to give out
relevant information. They hold back the information
because of its assumed proprietary value.
In a project carried out by the Center for the
Study of Ethics in the Professions at lllinois Institute
of Technology, under National Science Foundation
funding, we tried to get around these difficulties by
developing some historical and contemporary case
studies. The contemporary case studies covered
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computer software and genetically engineered
organisms, and the historical studies encompassed
the commodification of plants and the patenting of
innovations in medicine. Our most striking finding
is that popular assumptions are often not borne out.
For example, there is a popular belief that trade secret
protection deprives the scientific community of
opportunities to study new technology. From this
perspective, patent and copyright protection which
require publication are socially more beneficial and
ethically preferable to trade secrets.
In light of this popular belief, it is interesting to
look at the struggle over protecting computer soft-
ware. The struggle comes about in part because of
the peculiar nature of software. It has characteristics
of both copyrightable manuscript and patentable
process, that is, of both a literary product and an
engineering product Neither patent nor copyright is
entirely suitable. Trade secrecy protection has been
tried. However, trade secrecy protection tradition-
ally allows reverse engineering (by anyone who is
not restricted by a licensing agreement). This is a
time-honored right under the trade secret law. It
means that if one can figure out how the work was
made and how to make more of the same product
examining the product, using it, or taking it apart,
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one does not infringe on the rights of the trade secret
holder. In the domain of software, however, it turns
out that trade secrecy protection, with its openness to
reverse engineering, leaves too much information
publicly available. The difficulties of fighting soft-
ware piracy led major firms in the industry to seek
limitations on reverse engineering.
In an ironic twist, recent court decisions suggest
that it may be possible to use copyright to bar reverse
engineering. Traditional copyright, of course, applies
to a readable text where there is no issue of reverse
engineering. The use of copyright on software pro-
eets against copying of the literal "text" of a program.
However, most software is available only in machine
readable form. A researcher who wants to under-
stand the software for reverse engineering must first
put it into readable form. The process of putting it
into readable form will usually involve copying.
Courts have held that making a copy for the purpose
of reverse engineering infringes on the copyright.2
Such rulings redraw the boundary line between what
is public and what is privately owned. They thereby
cause concern about upsetting a traditional balance
between the interests of private property and the
values associated with propagating knowledge.
00000000000000000000 13 00000000000000000000
To pursue the point that outcomes associated
with intellectual property protection may be
surprising, I draw on the work of some economists
at Yale University who devised a clever empirical
investigation. One of them, Sidney Winter, partici-
pated in lIT's NSF-funded project. The economists
investigated how firms actually appropriate the
returns from innovation. By questioning respon-
dents from companies about their particular line of
business rather than about their companies, they
were able to get around the problem that people with-
hold information of proprietary interest. For the
study, they distinguished three major avenues for
appropriating the returns from innovation. These
avenues are the patent system, secrecy, and various
advantages associated with exploiting a head start.
One outstanding finding was that there was a signi-
ficant variation among industries about the means
rated most effective for appropriating returns from
product innovation.
Nonetheless, in most industries achieving a head
start and its associated advantages, such as the ability
to move down the learning curve ahead of rivals or
get ahead in sales and service, was rated most
effective. In some industries (drugs, pharmaceuti-
cals), patents were rated as reasonably effective. But
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in many industries where innovation is critical, the
gains to an innovator stem mainly from getting in
early and exploiting the advantage. This finding con-
trasts with the assumptions with which we began. In
most cases studied by the economists, gaining the
rewards of innovation does not depend as much
upon establishing intellectual property rights or pre-
serving secrecy as upon developing a new product or
process ahead of competitors and exploiting the time
advantage. With time, competitors can catch on if
they make the necessary investments.
Contrary to common belief, firms do not keep
tight controls on information about their new tech-
nology. Why? It turns out that the very staking of
claims requires the release of information. This is
obvious where patents are concerned. But in indus-
tries where patents are not particularly effective, and
aggressive use of a head start advantage is key,
companies have good reasons to stake their claims
through advertising, open meetings, and the like.
This is because they need to attract customers and
therefore have to tell them a lot about their new pro-
ducts. In doing so, they reveal things to their rivals
as well. In addition, corporate engineers and scien-
tists tend to reveal information, motivated by their
natural interest in discussing ideas with peers else-
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where and their concern for their professional repu-
tations. Furthermore, the lab's reputation has to be
upheld, for it is instrumental to hiring new scientists
and engineers.
For these reasons, firms have great difficulty
keeping secret generic aspects of new technology
they have created. It is easier, however, to keep
secret specific practical implementation. Because of
the location-specific and organization-specific
character of the details of a firm's particular product
and process technologies, they are difficult to copy
directly. In an industry where most firms have well-
trained and alert engineers and scientists and where
these professionals tend to communicate for a variety
of reasons, for example, at technical society
meetings, the general understanding behind particular
processes and products cannot easily be kept secret
for long. But rival firms do not get a free ride, for
they must make their own investment to create their
own specific ways of implementing this new know-
ledge.3
What does all of this suggest about drawing the
lines between private and public information and in
particular about extending or more strictly enforcing
intellectual property restrictions? It suggests that we
should not be preoccupied with intellectual property,
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but we should keep our eye on the broader question
about how innovators are enabled to reap returns
from research and development efforts and invest-
ment. Patents are important in some industries, but
are clearly not in others where other methods for cap-
turing the benefits of innovationpredominate.
This discussion has implications for universities.
It suggests that universities should maintain their
roles as guardians of public knowledge. If the
account I have offered is correct, companies gain
proprietary advantage from particular implemen-
tations of generic technology. The implementation
must be fine-tuned to their own particular circum-
stances, processes, and products. With certain
exceptions (computer programs and biotechnology),
university researchers are not themselves directly
useful for deriving profits from innovation. The
university contributesmore importantly to the system
of innovation by the training it provides young
scientists and engineers who go into industry.
Students learn basic principles and research tech-
niques in the university. Universities need to
maintain their function of generating knowledge that




Now I want to look at infonnation which is
perceived to be valuable because of its relevance to
national security. That infonnation is often technical.
In this sphere also we have seen in the last decade an
increase in restrictiveness. Though the final year and
a half of the Reagan administration brought some
abatement of control, regulatory authorization now
"in donnancy" can be activated when the political
climate shifts. Government initiatives included ex-
pansion of the government system of classifying
government documents as secret, and therefore, out
of the public domain; the requirement in some cir-
cumstances that government employees and the reci-
pients of government grants and contracts sign agree-
ments not to publish information without prior
review by the government; and the use of the Espio-
nage Act, the Invention Secrecy Act, and the Export
Control Laws to prevent or punish disclosure of
scientific and technical infonnation.
Government actions invoking the Export Laws
interfered with presentations of papers at scientific
society meetings and with personal contacts between
foreign scholars and American scientists. For
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example, in 1982, the Reagan Administration used
the Anns Export Control Act to persuade participants
in a conference on optical technology to withdraw
more than 100 papers. In 1980, the Administration
invoked the Export Control Act to induce the
sponsors of a conference on magnetic bubble
technology to withdraw an invitation to a group of
visiting scientists from Poland, Hungary, and the
Soviet Union. Under the Espionage Act, a govern-
ment employee was prosecuted for disclosing
classified information, an action ordinarily not
punishable as a crime. The United States, unlike
Britain, does not have an Official Secrets Act to make
disclosure of classified information a crime.
We naturally want to know to what extent
government restraints on the dissemination of sci-
entific and technical information are appropriate.
Here again, much is at stake. Three basic values
almost everyone recognizes as important underlie the
debate. One is the government's need for secrecy in
carrying out its responsibility for defense and foreign
relations. Another is a democratic society's need for
enough information to make intelligent decisions on
the issues of the day. The third is the scientific
community's need for open dissemination to allow
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the processes of criticism and replication to operate in
the research enterprise.
Here again we turn for guidance to the U.S.
Constitution, to the First Amendment which guaran-
tees the right of free expression. We look at the
rationale for First Amendment protection of expres-
sion to try to get a grip on the implications of this
constitutional right for the dissemination of scientific
and technical information. The classic case for free
expression is found in Chapter Two of John Stuart
Mill's work On Liberty. Contemporary discussions
emphasize two chief considerations found in Mill's
discussion. One is that we need an open flow of
speech to foster the growth of rationality in indi-
viduals and in society and to discover truth. The
second consideration is that free speeech is indis-
pensable for the democratic process. If citizens are
to participate in government and hold government
officials responsible for their actions, they need an
open flow of information. The importance of free
speech to democratic processes will be the focus
here.
We have to recognize an important distinction
between information generated under government
auspices and information generated outside
government. Government has a stronger claim on
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information it generates. Some would say it owns its
information and can protect this information as
companies protect trade secrets. Whether this
comparison is appropriate or not, the government's
claim on information it generates is not unlimited.
The task is to try to define the limits on the
government's claim. Of particular concern is the
government's use of the classification system and
other means to keep secret information it generates
about its own activities. Since 1971, the conflicts in
the cases which reached the Supreme Court for
adjudicationhave involved restraints by the executive
branch of government on the publication of govern-
ment secrets by the media or former government
employees.4
Historical experience convinces us that there is a
close link between the development of democratic
political processes and the demand that the
government disclose information about government
affairs. Events of late 1989 in Eastern Europe have
made this link very vivid to us. Citizens need
information about the actions of governmentofficials
to gain a more equal footing on which to judge and
criticize government policies. Beyond that, open
communication provides for a kind of checking
mechanism against misconduct by government
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officials.5 Restrictions on the flow of infonnation
about government affairs and the conduct of
government officials pose special risks different from
the risks from restrictions on other kinds of infor-
mation. Secrecy cloaking government affairs can
hide incompetence and corruption and encourage
carelessness in decision making. By reducing the
number of those "in the know," secrecy interferes
with scrutiny from inside and from outside. Officials
protected by secrecy may undertake enterprises that
they would otherwise avoid for fear that they might
be embarrassed or that the public would not tolerate
these enterprises. Think of covert operations in the
Iran-Contra affair. Furthennore, secrecy seems to
acquire a momentum of its own, spreading not only
because of the power it confers to shape policy but
also because of the ease with which one can stamp
"classified" on a report as against subjecting it to
careful review.
These general considerations have force when we
look at technical infonnation that relates to govern-
ment actions or reflects directly on the wisdom of
government policies. Restrictions on some kinds of
scientific infonnation -- results of weapons tests, for
example -- may diminish the ability of citizens to
take part in political decision making or their ability
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to hold public officials accountable for their actions.
There are risks that public officials might abuse their
position and hold back such information, risks that
do not arise with respect to other categories of tech-
nical information.
We appeal then to the importance of democratic
processes for drawing the line between information
that should be publicly available and information that
may be kept secret. The legal scholar, Benjamin
DuVal, points out that there are at least two kinds of
information that government can legitimately keep
secret. One category consists of information at the
level of details that have slight relevance to political
debate. The other consists of matters that, by com-
mon agreement and practice, are not appropriate to
settle by political debate.
In the category of details we might include, for
example, some technical data on weaponry. We
assume that the public can adequately assess the cost
and capabilities of a weapons system without access
to all the details of the design. An example of an
issue not to be settled by public debate is the decision
to dispatch a troop aircraft on a particular date. We
might also include the planning of a military oper-
ation before the fact. After the fact, information
should be disclosed, for it is critical to evaluating
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how the operation was carried out. The question of
whether to undertake a military operation at all,
however, need not fall into the category of matters
excluded from settlement by public debate. The
cases which are excluded from debate involve
matters which it would be self-defeating to make
available for public discussion.
Vexing choices arise when it comes to dealing
with government-generated scientific and technical
information that is important for democratic decision
making and at the same time is perceived to be valu-
able to potential adversaries. To deal with this prob-
lem, DuVal proposes categories of information that
government may not safely be allowed to suppress.
One category is information that a category of
information is being kept secret. We might call this
second-order information. Second-order information
should not be denied.6 Citizens cannot assess the
wisdom of a weapons system if they do not know
that the weapons system exists. For example, a
government should not keep secret the existence of
an anti satellite program. It may, however, justifiably
restrict information about the details of results of
tests or details of design of particular systems in the
anti satellite program. These are details that fall in the
category of what may legitimately be held back.
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DuVal suggests other "safe harbors" of infor-
mation that should always be disclosed. They
include information revealing a violation of law and
general information about the nature, capacity, and
costs of weapons systems.
The categories of information which may be
withheld and the "safe harbors" of information that
should always be disclosed help us draw lines
between what is public and what may be kept secret.
For the rest, what may serve best, in the view of a
number of scholars, is an administrative government
procedure for reviewing information on a case by
case basis, under general standards. The standards
should be formulated to ensure that citizens' rights to
information needed for participating in a democracy
and holding officials accountable will be given
weight along with dangers to national security.
Why are we led to look for a structuring process
and for an adequate institutional mechanism? We do
that because we want to avoid the prospect of gov-
ernment decision makers individually balancing, to
the best of their ability, the interests of national
security against the need for open flow of infor-
mation. Instead, we seek a procedure that would
ensure that these competing values will be weighed
in good faith. The advantages of devising appro-
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priate institutional procedures, in spite of the costs,
become evident from surveying the costs of secrecy
in the past. I will come back to those costs.
CONCLUSION
An interesting outcome of this look at the
boundaries between public and private information in
the commercial sphere and in the realm of
government restriction for national security is that we
find parallels. First, of course, are the parallel
appeals to the Constitution. Beyond that we note that
in the commercial realm generic knowledge cannot
easily be held back. It appears that dissemination of
generic knowledge is advantageous to society while
the costs to fInns are not disabling. Detailed infor-
mation about implementation of generic knowledge
turns out often to be so specific to the location and
circumstances of a particular finn that it is not valu-
able to outsiders. It is also easier to keep private.
When we turn to government information, again
we find an important distinction between generic
information and specific details. Generic information
is very valuable for democratic decision making, but
information about details may safely be kept secret.
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My final point of comparison concerns the
counterpart to presumptions favoring the expansion
of intellectual property protections, the tempting
assumption that placing the heaviest weight on
secrecy has good consequences for national security.
Again, that proposition is not easy to test. But here,
McGeorge Bundy's hindsight may be instructive.
He has studied in great detail one of the most impor-
tant national security secrets of the last 50 years, the
decision in the summer of 1945 to drop the first atom
bomb on Hiroshima. The deed was done on August
9, 1945.7
Bundy writes in his recent book Danger and
Survival, "The secrecy that had begun with a proper
concern not to arouse Hitler's interest had become a
state of mind with a life and meaning of its own, so
deeply ingrained that anyone who had asked just
why it was a secret now, in May, 1945, might have
had to wait for an answer. It was a secret now
because it had been a secret through the war."
Bundy goes on to say, "Whether broader and more
extended deliberating would have yielded a less
destructive result we shall never know. Yet one
must regret that no such effort was made."
Looking back at that truly fateful decision to drop
the bomb on the crowded city of Hiroshima, it is
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remarkable how few people were involved in the
decision and what little discussion took place. There
were not many more than a dozen people and the
evidence indicates that none played the role of a
strongly challenging angels' advocate. Bundy points
out that the test at Alamogordo that showed the bomb
worked could have been made accessible to neutral
observers and could thus have been used to induce
the Japanese to surrender without having their cities
bombed. Or, he points out, there could have been a
carefully worked out plan to warn the Japanese that
the terrible bomb would be used if they refused to
surrender. Bundy insists that there were ways to
protect the eventual attack from any risks created by
advance warning; decoys, feints, or fighter protec-
tion could have been used. The reason, he believes,
that such alternatives were blocked is that there was
never the sustained deliberation that might have led to
such plans.
If Bundy is correct, the error has been on the side
of secrecy. With hindsight, he finds that secrecy
was a cause of mistakes and amounted to deception
practiced on colleagues, the American public, and
U.S. allies. He is equally stern in his judgment of
the secrecy maintained by the Soviet Union.
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I hope I have shown reasons for tempering our
enthusiasm for both proprietary and national security
controls on information. I have tried to identify
grounds for drawing the lines between what is
private and what is in the public domain so that our
policy decisions will reflect what we are learning
about the effects of controls. The implications for
maintaining an open flow of information in
universities should be evident.
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